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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
There is widespread agreement that the Federal Reserve targets the federal funds 
rate. While it relatively easy to identify the Fed’s operating target, a more difficult and 
substantive questions is:  Does there exist a sufficient statistic—a single indicator—for 
monetary policy?  A sufficient statistic, if it existed, would be useful to policymakers who 
want to control the macroeconomy, researchers who want to understand the 
macroeconomy and perhaps forecasters who want to predict the quantitative impact that 
monetary policy would have on the future path of the macroeconomy.   
 Two approaches recently have been offered to find such a measure.  In one 
approach, researchers have argued that the real interest rate is the sufficient statistic for 
monetary policy. The idea is that movements in the real interest rate are key to the 
transmission mechanism from monetary policy actions to broad measures of economic 
activity. Economic theory is offered as support for this basic mechanism linking decisions 
made by central bankers to output fluctuations at business-cycle frequencies.1  
The second approach maintains that the nominal money supply is a sufficient 
statistic.  Admittedly, movements in the nominal money supply do not necessarily 
indicate course changes in a monetary policy, particularly in economies where the central 
bank is targeting a nominal interest rate. Still, Meltzer (1999) argues that there exists 
sufficient information from monetary sources, especially movements of the real monetary 
base, that helps predict movements in output. Nelson (2002) tests Meltzer’s claim and 
presents evidence that movements in lagged values of the real monetary base help to 
                                                           
1 See, for instance, Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Kerr and King (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), 
McCallum and Nelson (1999), and Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, 2002) for papers that present 
specifications interpreted as output demand being a function of the real interest rate. 
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predict movements in output. His findings are based on quarterly data from the United 
States and United Kingdom. 
The purpose of this paper is to broaden the scope of the on-going investigation on 
the correlation between monetary policy, money supply and output. Three questions 
motivate our investigation. First, Rudesbusch and Svensson (2002) study the relationship 
between monetary policy and output by estimating an output gap equation where the real 
federal funds rate serves as the sole measure of monetary policy.  Based on U.S. data 
covering the period 1961-1996 (they cite a velocity change after 1996 as rationale for 
truncating the sample) they find that movements in the ex post real federal funds rate are 
significant in explaining the real output gap.  Thus, our first extension is to determine 
whether there is a significant difference in the parameter estimates that occurs when post-
1996 additional data are included. 
Second, specifications such as those used by Rudebusch and Svensson and others 
routinely include a variable that measures deviations in output from trend, referred to as 
the output gap. A commonly used measure is the one computed by the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO).  A second question, therefore, is to assess whether the estimated 
regression coefficients and subsequent policy conclusions are sensitive to the method of 
detrending output.  In this vein we compare results based on specifications using the 
popular CBO gap measure to ones that decompose output into its trend and cycle 
components using the Hodrick-Prescott (1997, hereafter HP) filter. 
Third, following Meltzer and Nelson, we consider whether different measures of 
the money supply help predict movements in the output gap, given the influence of the 
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real rate of interest. Our sense is that economic theory leaves the appropriate measure of 
money as an open question. Meltzer’s claim (and Nelson’s evidence) that the real 
monetary base contains information that helps predict movements in the gap is based, in 
part, on the notion that this measure most closely reflects the operating choices made by 
the Federal Reserve. It may be that the broader monetary aggregates contain such useful 
information, and more. Consequently, we systematically assess this point by estimating 
separate equations corresponding to the monetary base, M1 and M2. 
Our results are easily summarized. By extending the data through the year 2000, 
our evidence indicates that there is a statistical break in the relationship between output 
gap and the real federal funds rate.  We present evidence that does not reject the break 
1982:4 as the break point. Our test statistics thus reject the null hypothesis of constant 
coefficients across the 1961-2000 period.2  The evidence suggests that conclusions based 
on this regression—and the usefulness of the real federal funds rate as the sufficient 
statistic for monetary policy—are not robust.  We find that the real federal funds rate is 
significantly correlated with output in the 1961-82 sample, but is statistically insignificant 
in the 1982-2000 sample.  We also find that this instability is not affected by the estimate 
we use for the output gap:  whether we employ the HP filter-based estimate of the gap or 
one using the CBO’s measure of trend output.  
Our evidence also suggests that Nelson’s results are sensitive to the estimation 
period. When base money or M1 is included in the regression with lagged gap and the 
                                                           
2  An alternative procedure would treat the join point as being a random variable. We specify a 
nonstochastic join point for two reasons.  First, this break point is used because velocities of the narrow 
monetary aggregates began to shift dramatically about that time. Second, this period is generally recognized 
as the end of the so-called monetarist experiment when the Federal Reserve reverted to its policy of 
focusing on controlling the federal funds rate and not the monetary aggregates.  
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real federal funds rate, we find a statistically significant correlation between lagged real 
money and the output gap in the 1961-82 sample, but find both to be insignificant in the 
1982-2000 sample. In contrast, when the broader M2 aggregate is used along with the real 
interest rate, there exists a significant correlation for both variables in both sample 
periods. However, this result is altered using the HP gap:  In that instance we find no 
significance of the real rate or any money measure over the post-1982 period.  The 
complex role of M2 in affecting output is considered in detail.   
We interpret our results as indicating that federal funds rate fundamentalism is 
just as misguided as money supply fundamentalism. In the heyday of Monetarism, many 
economists believed that some measure of money served as a sufficient statistic for 
monetary policy.  In recent years, in the wake of the success of the Taylor Rule, the same 
kind of optimism has come to surround the federal funds rate.  Perhaps, many hoped, the 
federal funds rate would fulfill the long-sought-after role as a sufficient statistic for 
monetary policy.  However, the results from this paper demonstrate that single-equation 
OLS models with just one or two monetary indicators, while serviceable for simulations, 
do not provide stable, statistically significant econometric results.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the model 
that is estimated. In Section 3 we present results for the baseline model, on the stability of 
the relationship when the sample is extended to include the 1997-2000 observations, and 
we extend the analysis to examine the sub-samples and examine the role of money as a 
marginal predictor of future output movements. Section 4 offers a brief summary and 
recommendation for future analyses. 
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2.  THE MODEL 
 Much empirical and theoretical analysis of monetary policy in recent years relies 
upon a dynamic general equilibrium model wherein nominal price rigidities establish lags 
in the effects of policy actions.  The model, used by Goodfriend and King (1997) and 
McCallum and Nelson (1997), among others, for a theoretical treatment of policy, is very 
much in the spirit of the standard IS-LM Keynesian model. Clarida, et al. (1999) dubbed 
it the “New Keynesian” macro model.3  The model is developed in greater detail in a 
variety of papers. Here we opt for a brief presentation, referring the reader to the other 
published works for details.4   
The so-called consensus model is described by three equations:  an aggregate 
demand equation, a Phillips-type curve equation and a policy rule.  A representative 
version of this dynamic model may be written as5 
(1) ygt = a ygt-1 + b Et(y gt+1) – c [Rt – Et(p t+1)] + e1t 
 
(2) pt = d (ygt) + w1 pt-1 + w2 Et(pt+1) + e2t   
 
(3)  Rt = r* + Et(pt+1) + f ygt-1 + g (pt-1 – pT) 
 
where ygt is the output gap, measured as the deviation of real output from its potential, R 
is the nominal rate of interest, p is the rate of inflation, r* is the equilibrium real rate of 
interest and pT is the central banker’s target rate of inflation.  The terms e1 and e2 are 
stochastic shocks, and the coefficients w1 and w2 sum to unity.6   
                                                           
3 Under particular specifications, the model delivers linear decision rules that roughly correspond to  the 
educed-form equations presented in the standard IS-LM model.  
4 See for example, Clarida, et al (1999) for a discussion and references. 
5 This version is taken from Meyer (2001).  It is representative of the models found in, among others, Fuher 
and Moore (1995), Clarida et al. (1999) or McCallum and Nelson (2000). 
6  To ensure that stability conditions for the system of first-order linear stochastic equations are satisfied. 
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 Equation (1) is akin to the IS equation in Keynesian models save for the fact that 
the output gap is dependent on future output as well as the real rate of interest.  A key 
element in this formulation is the forward-looking nature of the model.  The Phillips 
curve given as equation (2) reveals the role of expected inflation and past inflation, the 
latter component providing price stickiness in the model.  This price stickiness helps 
generate the lagged response time of the economy to policy changes, emanating from the 
policy rule given in equation (3).  In the policy rule, the interest rate is the central bank’s 
policy instrument and is adjusted as the economy deviates from the policymaker’s 
perception of where actual inflation and output growth are relative to the target rate of 
inflation and full-employment or trend output growth. 
 One distinction of this model is that it eliminates the LM function.  In a standard 
IS-LM model, the LM function describes equilibrium in the money market, where money 
supply and money demand equate to derive the market-clearing real interest rate.  The 
model above jettisons this relationship, replacing it with a description of how 
policymakers establish the equilibrium interest rate.  Policy actions are taken to adjust the 
money supply, given money demand conditions, to achieve an interest rate that satisfies 
the conditions laid out in equation (3).  In an older terminology, the money supply is 
demand determined and, if the rate of interest is fixed according to equation (3), it is the 
money supply that must accommodate changes in demand.  But, as many have noted, the 
Taylor Rule type of specification adequately captures the process by which modern 
central banks conduct policy.7 
                                                           
7 Still, there is much debate over the empirical robustness of the Taylor Rule.  Examples of studies 
investigating its stability and usefulness over time include Kozicki (1999), Hetzel (2000), and  Onatski and 
Stock (2000). 
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 Another feature of this model is that money plays no direct role in determining the 
path of output or inflation.  Instead of policy actions impacting money growth rates and 
then the economy via some real-balance effect, the policy transmission mechanism 
embedded in this model runs from policy changes that move the short-term real rate of 
interest which in turn affect the output gap which then alter inflation over time.  The 
assumed short-term rigidities in the model ensure that a change in the reserve position of 
the banking system impacts short-term real interest rates, since prices are slow to adjust.  
As Meyer (2001) suggests, this model “may bypass money, but it has retained the key 
conclusion that central banks ultimately determine the inflation rate.” 
 For this model to be a useful description of the dynamics of the economy and as a 
guide to monetary policy, it is important to establish the empirical validity of the link 
between policy actions and economic outcomes.  In that sense we focus on equation (1) 
and its empirical counterparts found in the literature.  We are interested in establishing 
whether the transmission mechanism from policy actions to the real rate to the real 
economy is robust.  If the gap is not affected in a predictable manner by changes in the 
real rate of interest, or if one can establish a direct effect of monetary aggregates on the 
gap independent of movements in real interest rates, then policy decisions based on this 
model are questionable. 
 Recent estimates of equation (1) have been made for several countries, though 
most attention focuses on results for the U.S. [Rudebusch and Svensson (2002), Nelson 
(2002)] and the United Kingdom [Nelson (2002)].8  We present the main regression result 
from Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) as a point of reference, especially given the 
                                                           
8 Amato and Gerlach (2002) provide estimates for South Africa.  
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attention their work has garnered.  Estimating a version of equation (1) for the U.S. over 
the period 1961 to 1996, Rudebusch and Svensson report the following outcome (t-
statistics in parentheses): 
(4)  ygt+1 = 1.161 ygt - .259 ygt-1 – .088 (i - pt) 
  (14.70)    (3.36)       (2.75) 
            _ 
 R2 = .90;  SE = .823;  DW = 2.08 
 
where ygt is the output gap, measured as the percentage difference between actual real 
GDP and potential GDP based on the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) construct, i is 
the four-quarter average of the quarterly average of the federal funds rate, and pt is the 
inflation rate, measured as the four-quarter average rate of inflation in the GDP chain 
weighted index.9 The variables are constructed as deviations from the mean values before 
estimation, hence the omission of a constant term.   
Rudebusch-Svensson (2002) report that this estimated relation is stable across 
their 1961-96, and that “lags of money (in levels or growth rates) were invariably 
insignificant when added” to equation (4).10  Rudebusch and Svensson use this  finding to 
argue for dropping monetary aggregates as one of the “three pillars” approach to policy 
established by the European Central Bank.  Indeed, Rudebusch and Svensson use this 
empirical result to support the theoretical conclusions reached in the model above, 
namely, that monetary policy should focus on the real rate of interest and eschew 
monetary aggregates in determining a policy course. 
                                                           
9 See Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) for more discussion of this. 
10 This outcome corroborates the findings of Gerlach and Smets (1995) who find that adding M2 or M3 
fitting a three-variable VAR model consisting of output, inflation and a nominal interest rate, does not 
improve the model’s explanatory power when estimated for each of the G-7 countries.  The inability of 
simple VAR models to reject the importance of money has been explored in Hafer and Kutan (1998, 2002).  
Their results indicate that, for many countries including the U.S., the assumed stationarity assumptions 
imposed on the data significantly impact the outcomes.  
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 This conclusion has been questioned by Nelson (2002).  Nelson argues that central 
banks choose to smooth out changes in real money balances; this turns a current change 
in real money into a signal of expected future changes in real money.  Therefore, since 
persistent increases in real money balances will push down long-term interest rates, 
today’s observable rise in real money is associated with a fall in the imperfectly-
observable (but extremely important) long-term real interest rate.  Meltzer (1999), using 
somewhat different reasoning, argues that monetary policy actions that adjust short-term 
real interest rates (assuming sticky prices) must impact the banks’ balance sheet.  If policy 
actions are not fully summarized by interest rate changes, and since interest rates are 
affected by more than monetary policy actions alone, then there exists an empirical role 
for the monetary aggregates to have an affect on aggregate demand that is independent of 
the real interest rate.  Indeed, Nelson’s estimates for the US and the UK using the real 
monetary base as an additional variable to equation (4) show that its lagged values are 
statistically significant.   
In the next section, we extend the analysis by examining the role of the real rate of 
interest and money in determining movements in the US output gap.  In addition to 
investigating the sensitivity of the results different measures of money—e.g., Nelson 
focuses on the monetary base, Rudebusch and Svensson on M2—we consider whether the 
way in which the gap is measured affects the policy conclusions drawn from the 
estimation results.  Perhaps equally important we address the question of whether the 
estimated relations are stable over time.   
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3.  ANOTHER LOOK AT THE RESULTS 
 Nelson’s (2002) evidence suggests that the results of Rudebusch-Svensson (2002) 
are sensitive to the choice of monetary aggregate included in the estimation.  Because 
their results have been cited as strong evidence in favor of a policy that focuses on the 
behavior of the real federal funds rate, it is imperative that other issues be addressed.  For 
example, Rudebush and Svensson use the CBO measure of potential GDP to construct 
their output gap even though there are alternatives that have been suggested in the 
literature, such as one based on applying an HP filter.11  Rudebusch and Svensson also 
argue that because the reliability of M2 may be hampered by a velocity shift that occurred 
in the early 1990s, they limit their analysis to a data sample that ends in 1996.  Are the 
results robust to extending the sample?  In this section, we re-consider the affects of the 
real rate and money on the output gap by considering a) the sample period, b) alternative 
measures of potential output and c) the inclusion of different monetary aggregates.   
3.1  Estimates of the Basic Model 
Table 1 provides our estimate of equation (4).  The variables are constructed as in 
Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) and Nelson (2002).12  Column (2) presents the results 
that we will henceforth refer to as our “baseline” estimate since it is most closely 
associated with equation (1) in the model described earlier, and it uses the same sample 
period as Rudebusch and Svensson.13  For purposes of comparison, column (1) of Table 1 
recaps the Rudebusch and Svensson results based on their 1961-1996 sample data.  Our 
                                                           
11 In an earlier paper, Rudebusch-Svensson (1999) suggest that using a simple quadratic trend approach to 
deriving the output gap does not substantially alter the results.   
12 Data for the federal funds rate and the GDP chain-weighted price index are taken from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED data base; the gap measure is measured using the CBO potential output 
series. 
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attempt to replicate their results is quite successful:  The magnitude and significance of 
the estimated coefficients are comparable, as is the overall fit of the equation.  The results 
in the first two columns of Table 1 indicate that, even after accounting for prior 
movements in the gap, the real federal funds rate possesses statistically significant 
information that improves the prediction of the gap.   
 Are these results sensitive to the sample period?  The estimates reported in 
column (3) of Table 1 address that issue by extending the sample through 2000.14   With 
regard to the updated sample, the CBO-based estimates using the 1961-2000 data are 
almost identical to those for the 1961-1996 sample. The estimated coefficients are quite 
similar in size and significance, as is the comparability of the summary statistics.  Thus, 
the evidence suggests that increasing the sample to the end of the business cycle does not 
materially affect the parameter estimates. 
Are the results sensitive to how one measures the output gap?15   We use two gap 
series, the CBO measure of potential output, and the other derived from an application of 
the HP filter. While the two series behave in a similar fashion across the sample, they are 
not identical:  the simple correlation is 0.74.  Moreover, the two series exhibit different 
characteristics at any one point in time.  For example, the relative size in the gap measure 
changes in the late-1960s, the early 1980s.  In the early 1990s the CBO gap measure is 
larger than that from our HP filter.  In 1996 that pattern shifts, with the CBO gap 
becoming increasingly positive and the HP gap measure indicating little difference 
                                                                                                                                                                             
13 Note also in this version we demean the data before estimation; hence the omission of a constant term. 
14 In this and all future regressions we do not demean the data prior to estimation.   
15 A number of papers compare and contrast alternative measures of potential output and how these 
different measures can impact policy decision.  A representative collection of such work is de Brouwer 
(1998), Clarida, et al (2000), Claus, et al (2000), Haltmaier (2001) and the CBO (2001).  Neiss and Nelson 
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between actual and potential output.16  Since this shift-point occurs exactly at the time 
when our sample-update begins, it is possible that the earlier results could be affected.   
The differences shown in the behavior of the gap measures suggest that comparing 
estimates using each measure is a useful robustness check on the baseline model.  
Column (4) reports the results for the full sample when the HP gap measure is used in 
place of the CBO gap.  While there are some quantitative changes, using the HP filter to 
generate the gap measure delivers the same qualitative story:  the lagged real interest rate 
continues to significantly impact the gap. 
 We also considered the overall stability of the estimated equations.  To this end 
we calculated standard F-statistics, using 1982.4 as the hypothesized break point.  The F-
test based on the 1961-1996 sample indicates that we cannot reject stability, at least at the 
10 percent level.  When the 1961-2000 sample is used, however, the null of stability is 
rejected easily.  As shown in columns (3) and (4), there is strong evidence of parameter 
instability in the estimated equation regardless of whether one uses the CBO or HP 
measure of the gap. 
 This instability is examined further by estimating the baseline model for each sub-
period.  These results are reported in Table 2.  Irrespective of the gap measured used, the 
sub-period estimates show that the real rate of interest has absolutely no predictive power 
for the gap in the post-1982 sample.  In both cases the estimated coefficient on the real 
rate, though correctly signed, is not statistically significant at any reasonable level.  It 
would appear, then, that the empirical importance of the real federal funds rate stems 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(2002) provide a useful discussion of measuring the output gap as it relates to predicting inflation within the 
framework of a New Keynesian Phillips curve.   
16 The sensitivity of HP filters around the beginning and end of samples is discussed in Haltmaier (2001). 
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from its correlation with the gap during the 1961-1982 period, but not since. This finding 
thus calls into question the reliability of the model’s ability to empirically pin down this 
part of the policy transmission mechanism. 
3.2  A Role for Money and Money Multipliers 
 Is there a direct statistical role for money within the model?  To investigate this 
question we add alternative measures of money to the baseline model.  Following 
previous related work we first created real money balances by deflating nominal money 
by the GDP chain-weighted price index.  To be consistent with the way in which the real 
rate of interest is measured, the money variable is then calculated as the percentage 
annual change in real money balances lagged one quarter.  Unlike Nelson (2002), who 
introduces money into the equation using simple lagged values of quarterly money 
growth, our approach is in the spirit of how the real rate is measured and estimated in the 
Rudebusch and Svensson study.   
Table 3 presents estimates of the baseline model with money added.  Three 
measures of money are used:  the monetary base, M1 and M2.17  The initial column under 
each money measure uses data for the full 1961-2000 sample.  The full-period results 
using the CBO gap are located in the upper panel of Table 3.  These results are uniform in 
two ways:  First, the estimated coefficient on the real rate of interest is negative, 
statistically significant and of nearly equal size across regressions.  Thus, as in previous 
work, there appears to be a significant affect of changes in the real rate on the output gap.  
Second, the estimated coefficient on lagged money also is statistically significant across 
regressions.  Whether money is measured as the monetary base, M1 or M2, money exerts 
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a significant, independent impact on the output gap.  Whether this reflects a real balance 
effect or Nelson’s (2002) direct money channel, these results reject the popular notion 
that money plays no role in determining the path of economic activity. 
 The bottom of each column reports the probability of an F-statistic calculated 
assuming a 1982.4 break.  For each CBO-based equation, the hypothesis of parameter 
stability is rejected, although only at the ten percent level for the equation that includes 
the monetary base.  As before, this raises the question of whether the statistical 
importance of the real federal funds rate and money found for the full period are limited 
to the pre-1982 observations.  The second column under each monetary aggregate 
answers this question.  There we find that, based on 1982-2000 data, only when the 
monetary aggregate is M2 is the significance of both the real interest rate and money 
maintained.  For the equations using the monetary base and M1, money and the real rate 
of interest are insignificant.  This suggests that relying on the simple baseline model may 
not adequately capture the dynamic and complicated relation between the real interest 
rate, real money balances and the economy.  The results using the CBO gap suggest that 
ignoring money in determining the transmission of monetary policy to the economy is 
unwise. 
 To determine if these results are robust to a change in the measure of the gap, the 
lower tier of Table 3 reports estimates using the HP-based gap measure.  Those estimates 
provide a different picture of the possible linkages between the real rate of interest, 
money and the output gap.  Looking first at the full-period estimates, the real federal 
funds rate continues to be statistically significant.  Changing the gap measure impacts the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 The nominal money measures are taken from the FRED data base.  The monetary base measure used here 
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estimated coefficients on money:  While M1 and M2 are significant, the coefficient on the 
monetary base is not significant at even the 10 percent level.18  The stability test results, 
reported below each column, indicate that instability is problematic only for the 
regression using M1.  For the regressions using monetary base and M2, however, we 
cannot reject stability at a reasonable level of significance.  Still, given our earlier results 
using the CBO gap, are the post-1982 results vastly different than the full-period 
estimates?  Those estimates corroborate the results found in the upper tier of Table 3:  the 
significance of the real interest rate appears to occur from the pre-1982 portion of the 
sample.  In contrast to the results using the CBO gap, when the HP gap is used the 
significance of M2 also is reduced.   
 Is there an explanation for the apparent instability in the affects of the monetary 
aggregates?  One way to address this question is to decompose the aggregates into their 
component parts; namely, the monetary base and their respective multipliers.  Leaving a 
theoretical discussion aside for a moment, the results in Table 4 are from regressions in 
which the monetary aggregates—M1 and M2—are decomposed into the base and their 
money multipliers.19 One result is common across this set of regressions:  as the sample 
period shrinks from 1961-2000 to 1983-2000 one sees a reduction in the coefficients on 
both the monetary base and money multipliers. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
is the St. Louis Adjusted monetary base. 
18 These results do not corroborate the findings of Nelson (2002).  Nelson uses Anderson and Rasche’s 
(2000) adjusted monetary base series which removes estimated holdings of U.S. currency from the St. Louis 
adjusted monetary base series.  For sake of consistency, one should adjust the currency component of all the 
aggregates.  Hence our decision to use the published data. 
19  Note that the money multiplier is measured in percentage change terms. More specifically, the difference 
of the log ratio of the monetary aggregate divided by the monetary base.  An early attempt to address this 
aspect of money’s importance is Gordon (1985). 
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 We are particularly interested in determining whether the coefficient on lagged 
base is significantly different from the coefficient on the lagged value of the money 
multiplier. As the results in Table 4 show, the estimated coefficients generally are 
significantly different from one another.20  Interestingly, under the HP measure of the gap, 
the size of the coefficients switch as the sample period gets shorter; that is, the coefficient 
on lagged base money is algebraically larger than the coefficient on lagged money 
multiplier in the 1961-2000. When we move to the 1983-2000 sample period, the 
coefficient on the lagged money multiplier is larger than the coefficient on the lagged 
monetary base. However, the differences between the coefficients again are not 
significantly different from one another.21  The implication is that the predictive content 
of lagged values of money is not materially affected by focusing on whether the money is 
inside or outside money.   
 Another surprising result is the statistical significance of changes in the monetary 
base in the M2-multiplier regression, regardless of the time period.  In the regression that 
only includes the monetary base, the role for money is small in the overall sample, and 
neglible and incorrectly signed in the post-1982 sample.  The story changes, however, for 
specifications in which the multiplier is included as an explanatory variable.  Focusing on 
the M2 results, we see that when the monetary base rises by 1%, output rises by between 
0.08 and 0.13 percent that quarter, regardless of the sample period.  The M2 multiplier 
also is statistically significant.   
                                                           
20 The Wald test probabilities from testing the hypothesis that the estimated coefficient on base money and 
the multiplier are, for the full period using the CBO gap,  0.24 and 0.11 for M1 and M2, respectively.  
When the HP gap measure is used, the probabilities are 0.34 and 0.87. 
21 The estimated probability for the M2 measure using the 1983-2000 data is 0.06, however. 
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These two facts—the larger role for the base and the positive impact of the 
multiplier—can be reconciled with the smaller role for the base found in most regressions 
if central bank innovations are responses to shifts in the multiplier.  If the multiplier rises 
this quarter, a central bank trying to stabilize output will often restrict base money.  This 
would lead to a lower correlation between money and output compared to a world with a 
stable multiplier.  Further, the M2 multiplier’s significant impact on output is itself 
interesting.  It raises questions about the proper way to think about money and the 
business cycle.  We now turn to these theoretical issues.   
3.3 Theoretical foundations of a role for money 
 These results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that while lagged M2 contains useful 
information about the current output gap, narrower measures of money apparently have 
lost some of their predictive usefulness over time.  Outside money has been a less useful 
predictor than inside money—money that represents liabilities of the banking system—in 
recent decades.  Why should this be so?   
 There is a substantial theoretical literature on the affects of outside money and 
inside money, much of which addresses these business-cycle questions.  The insight 
offered by this literature and our results is that changes in outside money and inside 
money may have different macroeconomic affects. To illustrate this point, in Freeman 
and Huffman’s (1993) economy a permanent increase in outside money can result in 
lowering the real return to outside money. Inside money endogenously increases and 
output increases. Here outside money and inside money are both positively related to 
future movements in output, as appears to have been the case in the 60’s, 70’s and early 
80’s.  Alternatively, a reduction in the cost of banking can result in higher real returns 
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paid on deposits and increases in future output.  In this second setting, inside money is 
positively related to output, but outside money is uncorrelated with output. These changes 
in the cost of banking could range from technologically-induced innovations to shocks to 
bank balance sheets, such as the shocks to California subsidiaries of Japanese banks, 
documented by Peek and Rosengren (2000).   
Our point is simply that there is a theoretical justification for examining outside 
and inside money as separate quantities in terms of each one’s statistical relationship with 
output. Movements in outside money can reflect very different economic forces than 
movements in inside money. As the Freeman and Huffman (1993) model illustrates, these 
economic forces can result in qualitatively different correlations between outside money, 
inside money, and output.   
Perhaps the clearest way to interpret the declining predictive power of inside 
money and the short-term real rate in our analysis is the commonplace observation that 
our financial system is far richer than in earlier decades.  The Federal Reserve controls 
the real short-term rate, to be sure.  In earlier decades, the U.S. economy’s behavior was 
consistent with Nelson’s (2002) model, where changes in money were proxies for 
changes in future real rates.  But in recently that has changed.  Real M2 forecasts future 
changes in the output gap, but narrower money measures that are more closely under the 
Fed’s control appear to have no substantial relationship with the output gap.  This may be 
because changes in M2 were caused mostly by changes in narrow money in the early 
period—where Nelson’s model accurately described U.S. experience—but in later 
decades changes in M2 tended to be caused by shocks emanating from both the public 
and private sectors.  Even though these shocks may explain the break down the 
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relationship between narrow money and output, the relationship between a broad money 
measure like M2 and output remains.   
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Our results indicate that the importance of the short-term real rate of interest as a 
sufficient statistic for monetary policy in the U.S. may be overstated.  Investigating the 
role of the real federal funds rate within the spirit of studies such as Rudebusch and 
Svensson (2002) and Nelson (2002), we find that the statistical importance of the real rate 
in explaining movements in the output gap is not robust.  Using a data set that spans the 
1961-2000 period, we find that the real rate-gap link is not stable.  Using a 1982 break 
point, our evidence suggests that the statistical importance of the real rate found in earlier 
work likely emanates from the 1961-1982 period.  When estimated using post-1982 data, 
the real rate has no statistically significant impact on the output gap at any reasonable 
level of significance.  This finding also is robust to changes in the gap measured used, 
whether it is the common CBO measure or one derived from an HP filter. 
We also have examined the potential role for money.  Our results suggest that 
calls for omitting money from the set of variables used to determine monetary policy 
actions are premature.  Though these results also are sensitive to the sample, with the 
strongest result coming from estimating a gap equation that includes M2 and the real 
federal funds rate.  We cannot reject the statistical importance of M2’s influence on the 
gap, independent of the influence from movements in real rate of interest.     
Are professional forecasters ahead of academic researchers in this area?  Indeed, 
why does the Conference Board continue to use real M2 as a leading economic indicator, 
long after the academic mainstream moved away from money measures in business cycle 
 21
research?  As Lucas (1976) argued so forcefully, forecasting and policymaking require 
two different tools.  But as Lucas (1977) reminds us, modern business cycle researchers 
may well return to the pre-Keynesian days where our predecessors hoped to catalogue and 
understand the many institutional factors creating economic instability.  The evidence 
presented here on the possible role of financial-sector “shocks” as a driver of business 
cycles naturally encourages us to find out whether the disruptive impact of those shocks 
can or should be minimized.  By including the oft-neglected money multiplier in this 
analysis, we uncovered evidence of the continued impact of both base money and M2 in 
recent decades, evidence that was not apparent in regressions that only include base 
money. 
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Table 1 
Estimates of Baseline Model 
Sample periods:  1961-96 and 1961-2000 
 
       Replication results1         Gap Measure2 
          RS    OURS     CBO       HP  
Variable3  1961-1996 1961-1996 1961-2000       1961-2000     
 
GAP (-1) 1.162  1.177  1.177  1.078 
  (14.70)  (15.09)  (15.74)  (14.34) 
 
GAP (-2) -.259  -.269  -.261  -.250 
  (3.36)  (3.49)  (3.53)  (3.32) 
 
Real Rate(-1) -.088  -.085  -.077  -.062 
  (2.75)  (2.74)  (2.57)  (2.23) 
 
Constant NA  NA  .002  .002 
      (2.12)  (1.87) 
 
_ 
R2  .90  .91  .91  .78 
SE  .823  .008  .008  .009 
DW  2.08  2.10  2.09  2.11 
 
F (pr)*  NA  .101  .039  .038 
 
1.  RS refers to Rudebusch-Svensson (2002).  These estimates use the CBO gap measure.  
Absolute value of t-statistics appear in parentheses. 
2.  HP refers to the gap measure, based on the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. 
3.  Variables are defined in text.   
4.  Probabilities for F-statistic based on 1982/IV break. 
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Table 2 
Subperiod Results1 
 
Gap Measure/Sample Period 
         CBO                                   HP                 
Variable  1961-1982 1983-2000 1961-1982      1983-2000     
 
GAP (-1) 1.083  1.195   .991  1.106 
  (10.50)  (10.84)  (9.72)  (10.26) 
 
GAP (-2) -.153  -.295  -.139  -.314 
  (1.46)  (2.80)  (1.32)  (3.13) 
 
Real Rate(-1) -.174   .012  -.160  .026 
  (3.45)   (.32)  (3.38)  (.76) 
 
Constant .003  -.0003  .002  -.0005 
  (2.10)   (.20)  (2.01)   (.36) 
 
_ 
R2  .910  .94  .781    .83 
SEE  .009  .005  .009   .004 
DW  2.03  2.20  2.07     2.30 
 
 
1.  See notes to Table 1. 
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Table 3 
Estimations Results with Money1 
     Results using CBO gap 
   Monetary Aggregate/Sample Period 
             MB       M1          M2    
Variable          1961-2000  1982-2000 1961-2000     1982-2000     1961-2000      1982-2000 
 
GAP (-1) 1.127       1.254    1.139             1.260           1.013      1.112 
  (14.44)       (11.33)    (14.90)         (11.76)         (13.28)    (10.36) 
 
GAP (-2) -.226       -.339    -.218  -.347           -.106      -.214 
  (2.99)       (3.16)    (2.85)  (3.28)           (1.42)      (2.07) 
 
Real Rate(-1) -.086       -.001    -.079   -.001           -.081      -.118 
  (2.88)       (.04)     (2.66)  (.15)           (2.91)      (2.46) 
 
M(-1)  .040        .004   .033  -.004            .106       .099 
  (2.06)        (.18)   (2.01)  (.28)          (5.18)      (3.47) 
 
Constant .002       -.000    .002  .0003            -.001       .002 
(1.39)       (.00)    (1.79)  (.23)            (.80)      (1.32) 
_ 
R2  .91       .94     .91    .94         .92        .95 
SE  .007       .005    .008   .005              .007       .005 
DW  2.10       2.27     2.06   2.29              2.05        2.21 
F (pr)*  .09     .00                 .06 
Results using HP gap 
  Monetary Aggregate/Sample Period   
          1961-2000  1982-2000         1961-2000     1982-2000          1961-2000      1982-2000 
 
GAP (-1) 1.050       1.198    1.042             1.200            1.005        1.148 
  (13.66)       (11.24)   (13.65)           (11.34)           (13.20)      (10.76) 
 
GAP (-2) -.233       -.368    -.209  -.366            -.152        -.304 
  (3.07)       (3.60)    (2.71)  (3.52)            (1.92)       (2.88) 
 
Real Rate(-1) -.065       .0001    -.066    .001            -.063        -.053 
  (2.36)       (.17)    (2.41)  (.12)            (2.35)        (1.18) 
 
M(-1)  .028        .004   .032  .002             .066         .050 
  (1.58)        (.20)   (2.10)  (.22)            (3.29)        (1.87) 
 
Constant .001       -.0001    .001  .0001            -.0001         .001 
(1.22)       (.05)    (1.55)  (.07)              (.12)         (.75) 
_ 
R2  .78       .85     .78  .85         .79  .86 
SE  .007       .005     .007  .004        .008   .004 
DW  2.12       2.36      2.09  2.35         2.07  2.28 
F (pr)*  .13     .001            .12 
 
 
1.  See notes to Table 1 
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Table 4 
Estimations Results with Base and Money Multiplier1 
     Results using CBO gap 
   Monetary Aggregate/Sample Period 
             MB    M1   M2    
Variable          1961-2000  1983-2000  1961-2000     1983-2000     1961-2000      1983-2000 
 
GAP (-1)  1.127       1.196     1.120             1.187        0.982  1.050  
  (14.44)      (10.54)  (14.29)         (10.31)       (12.53)  (9.62) 
 
GAP (-2)  -.226       -.296  -.211            -.301        -.086  -.155 
  (2.99)       (2.73)  (2.74)            (2.76)        (1.13)   (1.49) 
 
Real Rate(-1) -.086        .011   -.085             .012        -.087   -.158 
  (2.88)        (.26)    (2.81)             (0.29)        (3.12)   (2.82) 
 
MB(-1)  .040       -.002   .048            -.003          .131     .081 
  (2.06)        (.12)    (2.32)            (0.12)         (5.11)    (2.80) 
 
Multiplier(-1)    0.021            -.010          .102     .013 
     (1.08)            (.060)         (4.96)     (3.96) 
 
Constant  .002       -.0002    .002            -.001          -.001     .005 
(1.39)        (.07)   (1.40)            (.24)          (1.12)    (2.12) 
_ 
R2  .91       .93     .91             .93            .92       .94 
SE  .007       .005    .008            .005           .007      .004 
DW  2.10       2.19     2.07            2.22           2.06       2.12 
F (pr)*  .09     .00              .17 
Results using HP gap 
  Monetary Aggregate/Sample Period   
          1961-2000  1983-2000         1961-2000     1983-2000          1961-2000      1983-2000 
 
GAP (-1)  1.050       1.108     1.036             1.107           0.993    1.073 
  (13.66)       (10.17)   (13.41)            (10.10)          (12.85)   (9.89) 
 
GAP (-2)  -.233        -.314   -.209              -.310           -.148    -.247 
  (3.07)       (3.11)   (2.70)              (3.00)            (1.87)    (2.34) 
 
Real Rate(-1) -.065       .023     -.067               .022           -.065     -.063 
  (2.36)       (.64)     (2.43)               (.62)            (2.41)     (1.09) 
 
MB(-1)  .028      -.005        .039              -.004             .078      .032 
  (1.58)       (.24)     (2.04)               (.22)            (3.26)     (1.18) 
 
Multiplier(-1)        .027               .003             .062      .061 
        (1.49)               (.21)                   (3.02)     (1.87) 
 
Constant  .001       -.0002    .001              -.0001            -.0003      .003 
(1.22)       (.11)    (1.29)  (.07)              (.30)      (1.09) 
_ 
R2  .78       .83     .78  .83              .79       .83 
SE  .007       .004     .007  .004             .007      .004 
DW  2.12       2.30      2.09  2.29             2.07      2.22 
F (pr)*  .13     .000                .21 
 
